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Abstract:	
No	 scholar,	 policy-maker	 or	 practitioner	 of	 policing	 could	 be	 taken	 seriously	 who	 did	 not	
acknowledge	 and	 take	 into	 account	 the	 radical	 transformation	 which	 privatization	 and	
pluralisation	has	brought	to	the	field	of	policing	(Jones	&	Newburn,	2006).	Nevertheless,	this	
transformation	 is	 largely	 influenced	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 policing	 tradition	 in	 each	 nation	
state.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 argument	a	descriptive	analysis	of	plural	policing	 in	 the	metropolis	
Paris	is	presented.	Being	part	of	the	Napoleonic	policing	tradition	in	France,	Paris	takes	up	a	
unique	political	and	administrative	position	which	affects	its	security	architecture.	It	stands	
out	 as	 the	 most	 developed	 example	 of	 centralisation	 and	 the	 State’s	 wish	 to	 control	 its	
citizens.	Despite	the	observed	pluralisation	in	terms	of	privatization;	Paris	is	still	a	‘state’	in	
the	 state.	 Its	 Napoleonic	 tradition	 largely	 ‘suppresses’	 civil	 non-commercial	 initiatives	 and	
influences	 the	 development	 of	 municipal	 police	 forces	 and	 other	 public	 uniformed	
surveillance	agencies	in	Paris.		
	
	
Introduction	on	Plural	Policing	in	Paris	
	
Within	this	special	issue	on	the	local	reality	of	policing	in	European	metropoles,	Paris	cannot	
be	overlooked.	 Its	policing	tradition,	relying	on	a	high	level	of	State	centralization,	strongly	
influences	the	answer	to	the	central	question	of	this	special	issue:	“To	what	extent	is	a	local	
police	still	present	in	European	metropoles	and	how	is	this	reality	linked	with	other	actors	in	
the	security	field”?	Answering	this	question	implies	that	we	do	not	concentrate	solely	on	the	
‘police	 apparatus’	 but	 that	we	 need	 to	 address	 a	 broad	 ‘policing’	 concept	which	 includes	
formal	forms	of	social	control	such	as	other	public	uniformed	surveillance	agencies,	private	
commercial	security	agencies	and	civil	non-commercial	initiatives.		
	
Our	descriptive	analysis	of	policing	in	Paris	as	a	metropolis	is	inspired	by	two	main	concepts	
which	 are	 interrelated:	 plural	 policing	 and	 citizen	 participation.	 Plural	 policing	 refers	 to	
different	actors	(such	as	the	army,	private	security	companies,	other	regulatory	authorities,	
volunteers	 and	 citizens)	 being	 involved	 in	 policing.	 Crucial	 in	 this	 process	 is	 the	 changing	
power	 balance	 between	 government,	 the	 public	 police	 and	 these	 other	 security	 actors	
(Bayley	 &	 Shearing,	 1996;	 Crawford	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Jones	 &	 Newburn,	 2006).	 Although	 the	
modernity	of	the	concept	of	plural	policing	has	been	relativized	(Zedner,	2006),	in	relation	to	
citizen	 participation	 it	 is	 a	 challenge	 for	 each	 nation	 state.	 It	 touches	 the	 power	 relation	
between	citizens	and	the	state,	which	is	rooted	in	the	national	police	traditions.	It	brings	up	
the	discussion	about	which	role	the	state	can	play	for	citizens	who	want	to	take	initiative	or	
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want	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 security.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 manifestations	 of	 citizen	
participation	in	this	category	are	highly	influenced	by	the	legal	context	of	each	country.		
	
The	main	argument	of	this	article	is	that	the	nature	of	the	security	architecture	in	Paris	these	
days	(in	terms	of	pluralisation	and	privatisation)	is	still	strongly	influenced	by	the	true	nature	
of	the	policing	tradition	in	France	and	Paris	in	particular.	The	so-called	Napoleonic	tradition,	
relying	on	a	strong	history	of	an	entrepreneurial	state	and	an	instrumental	vision	on	policing,	
tattoos	 the	current	state	of	plural	policing	 in	Paris.	 Illustrating	this	does	not	only	 implies	a	
geographical	or	morphological	focus	but	also	a	historical	approach	to	better	understand	the	
impact	of	the	policing	tradition	on	policing	Paris	today.	As	a	consequence	this	article	has	a	
descriptive	nature	and	relies	heavily	on	documents	and	published	work	on	policing	in	Paris.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 should	be	noted	that	one	of	 the	authors	can	rely	on	empirical	 research	 in	
the	broad	 field	of	 policing	 in	 the	 city	of	 Paris	 (Monjardet	&	Mouhanna,	 2005;	Mouhanna,	
2002).		
	
We	develop	our	arguments	in	five	parts.	In	a	first	part	we	describe	the	context	of	Paris	as	it	is	
the	 economic	 and	 political	 centre	 of	 France	 and	 reflects	 a	 diversity	 in	 territories,	 security	
issues	and	plural	policing.	In	a	second	part	we	describe	the	political-administrative	context	of	
policing	Paris	and	the	almightiness	of	the	Police	Prefect.	Thirdly,	we	describe	the	emergence	
or	development	of	municipal	police	forces	and	other	public	uniformed	surveillance	agencies	
in	 Paris.	 In	 a	 fourth	 part	 we	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 position	 of	 private	 commercial	 security	
agencies	 in	 Paris.	 Finally,	 we	 conclude	 in	 relation	 to	 our	 initial	 question	 and	make	 some	
reflections	in	relation	to	plural	policing	and	citizen	participation	in	policing	Paris.		
	
Paris,	a	French	city	full	of	diversity.	
	
Paris	 is	 a	 French	 commune	 (town)	 covering	 105	 km²,	 with	 a	 population	 of	 2.249	 million	
inhabitants	 in	 20113,	 headed	 by	 a	 city	 Mayor	 and	 20	 district	 Mayors	 (districts,	 or	
arrondissements,	 vary	 considerably	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 area	 and	 population).	 The	Mayor	 is	
elected	 by	 the	 council	 of	 Paris,	 which	 is	 elected	 by	 the	 citizens4.	 The	 greater	 Paris	
metropolitan	area	 is	much	more	of	 a	 ‘mixed	bag’,	 comprising	of	 10.1	million	 inhabitants5,	
396	towns	of	all	sizes,	each	headed	by	their	own	mayor	with	their	own	authority	and	duties	
in	matters	of	 security.	Socio-demographics	differ	greatly	 in	Paris.	 For	example,	 in	 terms	of	
per	capita	income,	Neuilly-sur-Seine	(population	of	61.2006)	is	a	far	cry	from	Clichy-sous-Bois	
(population	 of	 30.0007),	 where	 the	 2005	 riots	 originated,	 with	 a	 net	 annual	 household	
income	of	83	835€	versus	15	314€8	respectively.	In	fact,	these	396	communes	seem	to	have	
very	 little	 common	 ground	 in	 terms	 of	 wealth,	 size,	 or	 political	 beliefs.	 In	 terms	 of	
organisational	 structure,	 the	 city	 of	 Paris	 must	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	 three	 adjacent,	
surrounding,	 100%	 built-up	 ‘départements’	 that	 comprise	 the	 so-called	 ‘petite	 couronne’,	
                                                
3 Source : Insee http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/recensement/populations-
legales/departement.asp?dep=75 
4 This applies for the District’s mayor as well.  
5 Source : Insee http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=20&ref_id=20667 
6 Source Insee 2012 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/recensement/populations-
legales/pages2011/pdf/dep92.pdf 
7 Source Insee 2012 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/recensement/populations-
legales/pages2013/pdf/dep93.pdf 
8 Source Insee http://www.insee.fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/esl/comparateur.asp?codgeo=com-93014 
3 
and	the	four,	larger	‘départements’	dubbed	‘grande	couronne’,	which	are	undergoing	a	fast	
urbanisation	 process.	 This	 whole	 group	 makes	 up	 the	 ‘Ile-de-France	 région’	 with	 a	
population	of	11.74	million	and	a	geographical	size	of	12	000	km².		
	
Nowadays,	 besides	 security	 people	 are	 worried	 about	 economics.	 A	 recent	 survey	 (2013)	
shows	that	the	main	concerns	of	people	living	in	Paris	are	unemployment	(56,5%),	poverty	
(26,0%)	and	crime	(13,7%)9.	15,2%	of	them	(in	comparison	to	18,5%	living	in	the	banlieues)	
feel	 that	 “crime	 is	 a	 priority	 for	 the	 government”.	 Victimization	 surveys	 show	 that	 people	
living	 inside	 Paris	 feel	 more	 secure	 although	 they	 are	 more	 victim	 of	 crime	 than	 the	
inhabitants	of	the	banlieues	or	the	limits	of	the	urban	area10.	In	2011,	7,2%	of	the	Parisians,	
5,7%	of	the	population	living	in	the	banlieues	and	3,6%	of	the	population	living	in	the	limits	
of	the	urban	area;	declared	that	they	had	been	“victim	of	aggression	(theft	with	violence)”.	
The	 figures	 for	 “theft	 without	 violences”	 are	 respectively	 15,2%,	 7,7%	 and	 5,0%.	
Nevertheless,	90,9%	of	the	Parisians	have	found	their	district	“safe”	in	comparison	to	88,3%	
of	the	inhabitants	of	the	banlieues.	The	finding	that	security	is	not	the	only	priority	in	Paris	is	
also	reflected	in	the	low	votes	for	the	Front	National,	an	extreme	right	political	party	which	
main	concern	is	insecurity	and	immigration.		
	
Different	‘territories’	
	
An	important	classical	subdivision	structuring	the	Paris	metropolitan	area	has	to	do	with	the	
separation	between	 the	periphery	 and	downtown.	 This	 line	 separating	 the	 city	 itself	 from	
the	suburbs	used	to	be	 in	 the	 form	of	actual	walls.	Today	the	physical	separation	 is	 in	 the	
shape	 of	 the	 ‘boulevard	 périphérique’,	 a	 six-lane	 freeway	 which	 surrounds	 the	 capital.	
Furthermore,	administrative	borders	exist	 in	Paris.	The	city	of	Paris,	enjoying	an	extremely	
peculiar	 status,	 is	 itself	 a	 ‘département’,	 distinct	 from	 the	 surrounding	 ‘petite	 couronne’	
ones	 (Hauts-de-Seine,	 Val-de-Marne	 and	 Seine-Saint-Denis).	 Traditionally,	 suburbs	 used	 to	
be	 where	 unwanted	 populations	 were	 relegated	 (Chevallier,	 1958;	 Merriman,	 1994).	
Throughout	the	19th	century,	new	industries	built	their	facilities	in	the	so-called	‘banlieues’	
and	workers	naturally	 settled	 there.	 It	gave	birth	 to	what	would	 later	be	dubbed	 the	 ‘Red	
Belt’	as	thanks	to	the	working	class	votes,	Socialists	and	Communists	gradually	rose	to	power	
in	the	city	councils	around	Paris	(Noiriel,	1986).	Later	on,	another	type	of	manpower	came	
from	the	French	colonies	to	work	and	settle	in	the	banlieues.		
	
Today,	 rightly	 or	 wrongly,	 the	 children	 and	 grand-children	 of	 these	 immigrants	 (of	 north-
African	 and	 sub-Saharan	 extraction	mainly)	 lay	 at	 the	 centre	 of	modern	 fears	 (Mucchielli,	
2002).	 To	 be	 more	 precise,	 the	 Parisians’	 vision	 is	 still	 shaped	 around	 the	 idea	 of	 two	
conflicting	worlds	:	the	civilised,	pacified	city	world	versus	the	‘banlieue’,	an	unruly	place	of	
disorder	and	confrontation	with	police	forces,	filled	with	idle	youths	‘holding	up	the	walls’.	In	
colloquial	 French,	 this	 phase	 –	 tenir	 les	 murs	 –	 refers	 to	 young	 people	 hanging	 out	
unproductively	 and	 typically	 leaning	 up	 against	 the	 walls	 and	 making	 a	 living	 out	 of	
trafficking	drugs,	stolen	goods,	stripped-down	or	even	burned-out	cars	(Kokoreff,	2007).	The	
October-November	 2005	 riots	 have	 but	 reinforced	 this	 view.	 Beyond	 the	 ‘périphérique’	 is	
                                                
9 IAU Ile de France, Août 2013 : Victimation et sentiment d’insécurité en Île-de-France, Rapport final de 
l’enquête de 2011 .  
10 Id ibid.  
4 
generally	perceived	as	a	‘ghetto’	(Lapeyronnie,	2008)	whose	mirror	image	is	Paris	as	a	‘rich	
man’s	ghetto’	(Pinçon	&	Pinçon-Charlot,	2008).	
	
This	conflict,	however,	only	partially	reflects	the	actual	situation,	and	overlaps	with	another	
chasm,	just	as	deep-rooted	in	history,	called	social	segregation.	Social	segregation	used	to	be	
vertical	 when	 poorer	 people	 had	 to	 live	 in	 harder-to-access	 upper	 floors,	 turned	 into	
horizontal	space	segregation	from	19th	century	onwards,	owing	to	technical	advances	such	
as	elevators	(Pinol,	2003).	Neighbourhoods	within	Paris	then	tended	to	‘specialise’	socially.	
Western	 Paris,	more	 upper	 class	 and	wealthier,	 differs	 from	 the	 eastern	 part	 of	 the	 city,	
which	 is	 traditionally	more	working	 class	 and	poorer.	While	 gentrification	 is	undeniably	 at	
work	in	eastern	Paris	these	days,	low-income	households	remain,	especially	in	north-eastern	
arrondissements	 where	 cheap	 social	 housing	 is	 still	 available	 (Pinçon	 &	 Pinçon	 Charlot,	
2004).	An	administrative	euphemism	to	designate	rough	urban	areas	within	Paris	are	the	so-
called	 ‘zones	 urbaines	 sensibles’	 [ZUS].	 These	 zones	 display	 similar	 characteristics	 as	
suburban	 areas	 such	 as	 social	 housing	 with	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	 immigrants,	 high	
unemployment	 and	 poverty	 rates,	 and	 various	 forms	 of	 trafficking.	 The	 gentrification	
process	stumbles	against	one	major	issue.	Wealthier	families	will	not	send	their	children	to	
the	same	schools	as	‘such	people’	because	they	are	concerned	about	security	and	the	quality	
of	education	(Van	Zanten,	2009).		
Nevertheless,	 considering	 Paris’	 banlieues	 under	 the	 prism	 of	 poverty	 alone	 would	 be	
extremely	 simplistic.	 Again,	 drawing	 an	 East-West	 dividing	 line	 is	 a	 relevant	 simplification.	
The	 northeastern	 ‘département’	 of	 Seine	 Saint	 Denis	 can	 be	 contrasted	 to	 the	 Hauts	 de	
Seine	department.	The	former	being	the	cradle	of	the	2005	riots	while	the	latter	is	home	to	
some	of	the	richest	communes	in	France	as	well	as	the	headquarters	of	many	national	and	
multinational	companies.	
	
Inherent	to	these	different	‘territories’	are	the	movements	and	large-scale	population	flows	
generated	 by	 this	 situation.	 On	 a	 daily	 basis	 Paris	 attracts	 numerous	 workers	 from	 all	
adjacent	regions.	As	a	European	metropolis	it	is	swarming	with	tourists.	Furthermore	Paris	is	
home	 to	 5,200	 celebrations,	 sports	 events,	 inaugurations,	 and	 ceremonies	 yearly11.	 The	
dense	public	 transportation	network,	added	 to	 the	 relative	proximity	of	 central	Paris	 from	
rough	suburban	areas,	leads	young	people	from	the	latter	(‘les	jeunes	des	quartiers’	as	they	
are	 called)	 to	 go	 to	 Paris	 in	 order	 to	 party,	 or	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 many	 events	
happening	there.	The	central	area	of	Les	Halles,	a	transportation	hub	where	many	subway	
and	train	lines	converge,	is	particularly	spectacular	in	this	respect,	but	other	places	are	just	
as	 crowded	 on	 occasion.	 Demonstrations	 of	 all	 kinds	 (industrial	 workers,	 farmers,	 civil	
servants	etc.)	are	frequent	in	Paris.		
These	 kind	 of	 flows	 are	 one	 of	 the	 main	 security	 challenges	 for	 the	 police.	 One	
characterization	of	the	public	demand,	at	 least	 its	understanding	by	the	police	forces,	 is	to	
preserve	the	 invisible	borders	between	the	different	areas	 (Donzelot,	2008).	A	“small”	 riot	
with	 people	 from	 ethnic	minorities	 in	 a	 rich	 area	 in	 the	western	 part	 of	 the	 city	 (like	 for	
example	on	the	14th	of	May	2013	in	the	Trocadero,	in	front	of	the	Tour	Eiffel)	is	unbearable	
for	 the	 inhabitants	 and	 for	 the	 police	 authorities.	 Groups	 of	 youngsters	 leaning	 up	 are	
tolerated	 only	 in	 “their”	 areas	 but	 under	 the	 pressure	 of	 police	 forces	 if	 they	 enter	 rich	
preserved	 zones	 (Mouhanna,	 2002).	 It	 reinforces	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 main	 concern	 of	 the	
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police	 is	managing	 the	movement	of	people	 instead	of	developing	 their	 relationships	with	
people	actually	living	in	Paris	(which	comprises	only	a	small	percentage	in	these	flows).		
	
Different	security	issues	
	
In	terms	of	security	the	Paris	metropolitan	area	can	be	described	as	comprising	three	types	
of	 territories,	 essentially	 distributed	 along	 the	 East-West	 and	 centre-periphery	 axes	
described	 above,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 security	 issues.	 The	 first	 type	 are	 relatively	 quiet	
residential	 areas,	 where	 residents	 mostly	 fear	 burglaries	 and	 imported	 crime	 from	
neighbouring	places.	The	second	type	are	tourist	areas	where	shopkeepers	(who	often	live	
elsewhere),	foreign	travellers	and	underprivileged	suburban	dwellers	‘on	the	town’	mingle	–	
much	to	the	delight	of	pickpockets,	crooks	and	bag	snatchers,	not	to	mention	traffickers.	The	
third	type	are	rough	social	housing	areas	called	‘les	quartiers	sensibles’.	In	this	area	there	is	a	
vital	 underground	 economy	 to	 sustain	 a	 marginally	 decent	 way	 of	 life.	 The	 figure	 of	 the	
‘young’	male	 immigrant	seems	to	crystallise	all	 fears.	A	 fourth	type	could	be	added.	These	
are	changing	areas	due	to	gentrification.	Their	status	is	rapidly	shifting	from	underprivileged	
neighbourhood	 with	 rather	 old	 buildings,	 to	 that	 of	 a	 ‘hype’	 area,	 before	 ultimately	
becoming	yet	another	residential	or	tourist	district.	
	
Obviously,	 security	 and	 feelings	 of	 insecurity	 vary	 considerably	 according	 to	 the	 area	
mentioned	above.	‘Rough	areas’	tend	to	be	those	with	the	most	problems	as	far	as	security,	
poverty	and	unemployment	are	concerned.	They	also	suffer	from	bad	relationships	between	
police	 officers	 and	 the	 local	 population.	 They	 are	 an	 extreme	 example	 of	 the	 systemic	
difficulties	 encountered	 in	 French	police	propensity	 to	 act.	 In	 other	words,	while	 they	 are	
plagued	 with	 the	 most	 hardships,	 yet	 they	 do	 not	 enjoy	 an	 adequate	 policing	 response.	
42,5%	of	 people	 living	 in	 the	 banlieues	 (in	 comparison	 to	 32,4%	of	 the	 Parisians)	 indicate	
that	 there	 are	not	 enough	police	 forces	 in	 their	 district12.	 This	 lack	of	 appropriate	 answer	
from	 police	 forces	 can	 also	 be	 felt,	 in	 a	 more	 mitigated	 way,	 in	 other	 types	 of	 areas.	
Unfortunately	 there	 are	 no	 detailed,	 comparable	 figures	 available	 in	 relation	 to	 these	
different	areas.		
	
Figures	on	the	level	of	the	City	of	Paris	as	a	whole	indicate	that	crime	against	property	(66,8	
to	 35,16/1000	 inhabitants),	 crime	 against	 persons	 (17,5	 to	 7,52/1000	 inhabitants)	 and	
financial	 crime	 (10,9	 to	 5,71/1000	 inhabitants)	 are	 higher	 than	 the	 average	 in	 France13.	
Furthermore,	crime	rates	varies	from	one	place	to	another.	 In	St	Denis	(north	of	Paris)	the	
crime	ratio	for	1000	inhabitants	was	166,50	in	2008	and	44,77	in	St	Cloud	(west	of	Paris)14.	
We	must	be	careful	with	this	kind	of	figures.	 It	 is	recognized,	even	by	official	services,	that	
these	figures	are	subject	to	many	manipulations	in	order	to	persuade	people	that	politicians	
and	 police	 chiefs	 control	 crime	 in	 their	 area	 (Matelly	 &	 Mouhanna,	 2007	 ;	 Robert	 &	
Zaubermann,	2011;	Gagneron,	2014).	
	
Diversity	in	public	policing	
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Within	 Paris15	 the	 official	 police	 to	 population	 ratio	 is	 201	 persons	 per	 police	 officer,	
compounded	by	 the	 fact	 that	many	 law	enforcement	units	are	based	 in	Paris.	 These	units	
add	up	to	about	13,000	Riot	Control	Forces	(CRS,	Compagnies	Républicaines	de	Sécurité),16	
and	 17,000	 gendarmes17	 which	 are	 stationed	 all	 over	 the	 French	 territory	 but	 never	
intervene	 in	 their	 own	district.	 According	 to	 a	 long-established	principle	 these	 forces	 deal	
only	 with	 geographically	 distant	 problems	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 any	 issues	 stemming	 from	
potential	 closeness	 with	 demonstrators.	 Hence,	 many	 of	 these	 gendarmes	 and	 public	
security	police	often	stay	in	Paris,	spending	a	few	weeks	there	before	coming	back	to	their	
unit.	They	supplement	the	permanent	staff	of	police	stations.	Their	presence	illustrates	the	
main	 priority	 of	 the	 police	 forces:	 to	 preserve	 order,	 to	 fight	 against	 demonstrators	 and	
rioters.	 It	has	 to	be	noticed	 that	not	only	 these	 specialists	 are	embedded	 in	 this	 issue.	All	
police	forces	in	Paris,	including	the	local	police	stations,	are	involved	in	this	fight.	They	spend	
most	 of	 their	 time	 on	 supervising	 any	 kind	 of	 crowd	movement.	 The	 districts	 chiefs	 (‘les	
commissaires’)	are	in	charge	of	the	supervision	of	all	police	forces	in	their	area	(Monjardet	&	
Mouhanna,	2005).		
	
Tourists	visiting	Paris	will	notice	that	in	the	Airports	and	in	the	main	railway	stations,	military	
officers	are	patrolling.	They	are	participating	to	the	big	surveillance	system	used	to	answer	
the	perceived	threat	of	terrorist	attacks.	Because	Paris	is	the	head	of	the	French	centralized	
political	administration,	all	governments	are	very	careful	of	any	event	that	could	affect	the	
city,	 official	 buildings	 and	 its	 inhabitants.	 The	 concentration	 of	 economic,	 political,	 and	
symbolic	power	in	one	place	makes	Paris	very	sensitive	to	any	kind	of	‘attack’	(ranging	from	
political	demonstrations	to	terrorist	attacks)	directed	towards	those	in	power.	
	
Behind	this	picture	lies	the	idea	that	the	considerable	police	staffing	of	inner	Paris	is	justified	
by	the	need	to	protect	the	city	from	the	threats	that	 lay	close	at	hand.	Paris	police	forces,	
and	for	that	matter	French	police	forces	in	general,	are	a	control	tool	directed	against	mobs	
and	potential	uprisings	rather	than	a	public	service.	In	this	system,	policing	levers	are	pulled	
and	strategic	decisions	are	made	at	bureaucratic	 level.	 In	Paris,	police	bureaucracy	 is	both	
powerful	 and	 omnipresent.	 In	what	 follows	 the	 political-administrative	 context	 of	 Paris	 is	
described	in	order	to	better	understand	this	current	state	of	policing	in	this	metropolis.		
	
The	political-administrative	context	of	policing	Paris:	the	almightiness	of	the	
Police	Prefect	
	
It	 should	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	 Paris	 uprisings,	 before	 the	 French	 Revolution	 in	 1358,	
1382,	1413	and	1648	against	the	great	Louis	XIV,	and	in	1789,	1830,	1848,	and	1871,	each	of	
which	led	to	an	overthrow	of	the	ruling	regime,	made	a	long-lasting	impact	on	both	the	local	
and	national	French	political	 landscape.	Since	then	most	governments	have	considered	the	
control	of	the	Paris	population	as	a	priority	in	their	security	policies,	in	order	not	to	allow	the	
capital	city’s	leadership	to	become	a	stronghold	of	power.	Accordingly,	they	reached	several	
conclusions.	 Firstly,	 Paris	 did	 not	 have	 a	 mayor	 at	 all	 from	 1794	 to	 February	 1848,	 from	
                                                
15 Source : Paris Prefecture of Police- http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr 
16 Source: Min. Interior 
17 Source:  Gendarmerie nationale. The National Gendarmerie is a military institution in charge of public safety 
with police duties among the civilian population. 
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August	1848	to	1870,	and	between	1871	and	1977.	The	State	simply	assumed	direct	control	
during	these	periods.	Secondly,	public	order	was	a	priority	including	the	protection	of	public	
buildings,	ministries	and	congress	halls	in	particular,	or	the	supervision	of	state	visits	and	the	
control	 of	 demonstrations.	 This	 prompted	most	 experts	 (Monjardet,	 1996)	 to	believe	 that	
public	 order	 policing	 benefiting	 the	 State	 had	 ended	 up	 replacing	 policing	 serving	 the	
citizens.	Although	this	is	not	exclusive	to	the	greater	Paris	area;	it	is	more	explicit	given	the	
number	of	national	administrations	with	headquarters	in	the	capital	city.	
	
In	terms	of	security	management,	Paris	is	both	an	exception	in	the	French	environment	and	
a	paradigmatic	example	of	the	issues	the	French	police	has	to	cope	with.	It	is	the	capital	city	
of	a	state	that	remains	extremely	centralised	especially	 in	 its	policing	and	security	policies.	
Given	 its	 political,	 economic	 and	 demographic	 prominence,	 the	 Paris	 metropolitan	 area	
stands	 quite	 apart	 in	 the	 country.	 Paradoxes	 can	 be	 found	 all	 over	 the	 city.	 The	 greatest	
concentration	 of	 wealth	 lies	 right	 next	 to	 the	 largest	 underprivileged	 population.	 Upscale	
neighbourhoods	 are	 but	 minutes	 of	 public	 transportation	 away	 from	 the	 poorest	 areas	
plagued	with	hardships,	which	infamously	attracted	global	media	attention	during	the	riots	
of	November-December	2005.	The	road	surrounding	Paris	along	the	line	of	the	former	city	
walls,	called	the	‘boulevard	périphérique’	seems	to	act	as	a	border	between	the	city	and	the	
suburbs.	 Nonetheless,	 some	 working	 class	 areas	 remain	 within	 Paris	 itself	 and	 not	 all	
suburbia	is	populated	by	angry	workers	and	immigrants	on	the	verge	of	revolt.	Indeed,	some	
of	these	banlieues	do	concentrate	a	significant	part	of	French	wealth.		
	
Those	 various	 economic	 and	 geographic	 paradoxes	 entail	 very	 complex	 political	 and	
administrative	 organisational	 issues.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Mayor	 of	 Paris	 (the	 largest	 city	 in	
France)	 is	 the	 least	 empowered	 in	 the	 whole	 country	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 security	 policy-
making.	In	Paris,	more	than	anywhere	else	in	France,	the	State	plays	an	instrumental	role	in	
security	management	policies,	 through	one	dedicated	organisation:	 the	Paris	Prefecture	of	
Police.	Created	by	Napoleon	I	on	February	17,	1800,	this	organisation	is	the	sole	depository	
of	prerogatives	 that	 in	other	 cities	belong	 to	 the	mayor,	 such	as	 security,	 road	 safety	and	
maintenance,	 street	 sweeping,	 or	 peace	 and	 quiet.	 It	 also	 somewhat	 eats	 into	 the	
competencies	 of	 the	 Prefect	 of	 Paris	who	 is	 the	 official	 representative	 of	 the	 State	 (each	
‘département’	has	one)	who	is	in	charge	of	public	order.	Police	forces	as	well	as	fire	fighters	
and	hygiene	departments	report	to	the	Prefect	of	Police.	The	Police	Prefect	is	a	high-ranking	
civil	servant	endowed	with	enough	power	to	impose	his	own	security	policy	upon	the	Paris	
metropolitan	area.		
	
However,	the	Mayor	of	Paris	 (along	with	his	colleagues	of	the	neighbouring	towns)	cannot	
help	 but	 get	 thoroughly	 involved	 in	 security	 issues.	 This	 has	 been	 an	 ongoing	 concern	 in	
French	politics	for	the	last	thirty	years	at	least,	both	locally	and	nationally.	While	the	various	
security	 bills	 enacted	 these	 last	 few	years	 did	 increase	 their	 policing	prerogatives,	mayors	
haven’t	been	able	to	take	the	‘upper	hand’	in	this	field,	least	of	all	in	Paris.	In	this	area	local	
and	national	authorities	are	engaged	in	an	ongoing	struggle.	Mayors	are	balancing	between	
the	will	to	exact	more	power	in	matters	of	security	and	the	temptation	to	withdraw	entirely,	
washing	their	hands	in	favour	of	the	central	State.	In	Paris,	the	problem	is	compounded	by	
the	 presence	 of	 nearly	 all	 central	 state	 institutions	 having	 their	 headquarters	 in	 the	 area.	
This	makes	the	structural	conflict,	pitching	the	local	versus	the	national,	particularly	acute.		
	
8 
Some	observers	note	that	the	Paris	Prefecture	of	Police	has	become	to	a	large	extent	a	‘state	
within	 the	State’,	 insofar	as	 its	 leadership	has	considerable	means	and	staff	at	 its	disposal	
(Renaudie,	 2008).	Historically,	 this	 is	 explained	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Prefecture	of	 Police	 is	
heir	to	the	most	ancient	national	police	force	in	the	country,	that	of	Paris.	Until	1941	most	
French	cities	had	a	municipal	police	force,	Paris	being	an	exception	(Vogel,	1993).	The	first	
state	owned	police	force	in	Paris	was	created	in	1667,	prefiguring	the	Napoleonic	Prefecture	
de	Police,	which	was	 the	model	 for	 the	national	 police	 force	 in	 July	 1941.	Until	 1966,	 the	
Paris	 police	 department	 enjoyed	 special	 status	 within	 the	 national	 police	 as	 it	 had	 for	
instance	in-house	staff	management	rules.	While	this	is	not	the	case	anymore,	the	Prefect	of	
Police	 undeniably	 remains	 an	 autonomous	 and	 powerful	 character,	 in	 practice	 largely	
independent	from	the	Ministry	of	Interior.		
	
Headquartered	 in	 the	 Ile	de	 la	Cité,	at	 the	heart	of	Paris,	a	 traditional	place	of	power,	 the	
prefect	 operates	 autonomously.	 With	 in-house	 departments	 such	 as	 criminal	 police	
(Direction	de	la	Police	Judiciaire),	intelligence	(Direction	du	renseignement)	and	public	order	
&	traffic	control	(Direction	de	l’ordre	public	et	de	la	circulation)	its	organisational	structure	is	
almost	the	same	as	that	of	their	counterparts	at	the	Ministry.	The	Paris	Prefect	of	Police	is	
being	 comfortably	 staffed	 and	 endowed.	 For	 example	 the	 criminal	 police	 for	 the	 Paris	
metropolitan	 area	 does	 reflect	 its	 special	 status	 as	 it	 includes	 84	 (out	 of	 303)	
superintendents	 (Commissaires	de	Police	 Judiciaire),	1,142	 (out	of	2,956)	officers	 (Officiers	
de	Police	Judiciaire)	and	717	(out	of	1,76918)	rank	and	file	(Gardiens	de	Police	Judiciaire)	.The	
Paris	 Prefect	 of	 Police	 can	 stand	 his	 ground	 even	 against	 the	 Minister	 of	 Interior	 or	 the	
Mayor	of	Paris.		
	
Hence,	the	Mayor	of	Paris	would	stand	unfavourably	if	pitted	in	a	power	struggle	against	the	
Prefect	of	Police.	Although	the	city	takes	a	significant	part	in	the	funding	of	the	Paris	Police	
Prefect,	it	lacks	significant	influence	on	the	process	of	policy	making.	For	example	the	Mayor	
has	to	negotiate	street	planning	issues,	such	as	one-way	streets,	car-free	zones,	or	anti-car	
policies	 with	 the	 Prefect.	 As	 a	 result,	 his	 position	 is	 lopsided.	 The	Mayor	 of	 Paris,	 whose	
population	 is	quite	sensitive	 to	matters	of	security,	city	planning,	or	 traffic,	has	 to	actually	
negotiate	with	the	Prefect	of	Paris,	whose	operations	are	funded	by	the	city	council.		
	
On	the	metropolitan	level,	the	competencies	of	the	Prefecture	of	Police	vary	as	a	function	of	
distance	from	Paris.	Within	the	city	itself,	the	Prefect	of	Police	concurrently	holds	important	
prerogatives.	All	police	forces	report	directly	to	him,	including	parking	wardens.	Until	2009,	
in	 the	 surrounding	 ‘petite	 couronne’	 départements,	 only	 the	 Criminal	 Police	 Force	 (Police	
Judiciaire,	 part	 of	 the	 National	 Police)	 and	 fire	 fighters	 report	 to	 him.	 The	 public	 security	
police,	i.e.	uniformed	police	stations	with	several	detectives	at	most,	report	to	the	Ministry	
of	 Interior	 and	 its	 local	 representatives.	Additional	 prerogatives	pertaining	 to	public	 roads	
are	completely	out	of	his	remit.	In	the	next	circle,	the	‘grande	couronne’	départements,	he	
has	no	influence	since	all	security	matters	are	dealt	with	by	the	ministry’s	police	agencies.		
	
Still,	even	though	the	power	of	the	Prefect	of	Police	tends	to	wane	far	from	Paris	—	which	is	
not	the	case	of	the	Minister	of	Interior,	whose	authority	extends	to	the	whole	country	—	he	
remains	an	autonomous	player	to	be	reckoned	with.	In	200919	his	prerogatives	were	further	
                                                
18 Source: Ministry of Interior-effectifs de police 2011 
19 14th of March, 2009 
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extended,	 since	 each	 and	 every	 national	 police	 officer	 within	 the	 ‘petite	 couronne’	 now	
reports	to	him,	a	sum	total	of	26,000	police	officers.20	This	decision	was	taken	without	the	
consultation	of	any	mayor,	neither	in	Paris	nor	in	towns	included	into	the	new	system.	It	was	
an	 agreement	 between	 the	Ministry	 of	 Home	 Affairs	 and	 the	 Prefect	 of	 Police.	 The	 new	
organisation	 was	 adopted	 five	 years	 before	 a	 law	 passed	 to	 organize	 the	 new	 Paris	
metropolis	political	council	with	124	towns	around	the	capital	city	on	January	27,	2014.	The	
new	police	organization	includes	the	police	officers	working	in	Paris	and	in	these	124	towns	
from	the	banlieues.	It	does	not	include	the	Riot	Control	Forces	(CRS)	and	mobile	gendarmes	
(the	 crowd	 control	 units	 of	 the	 gendarmerie),	 which	may	 however	 occasionally	 report	 to	
him.	 Several	 CCTV	 networks,	 whose	 control	 rooms	 are	 centralised	 at	 the	 Prefecture,	
reinforce	this	feeling	of	omnipresence	and	almightiness.		
	
Important	to	notice	is	that	since	2003,	president	Sarkozy	has	put	an	end	to	all	attempts	to	
implement	 a	 community	 policing	 strategy	 within	 the	 French	 National	 Police	 Force	
(Mouhanna,	 2011).	 This	 decision	 has	 been	 taken	 without	 any	 local	 debate.	 Like	 the	
implementation	 of	 community	 policing	 in	 Paris	 in	 1999,	 the	 change	was	 decided	 amongst	
high	level	civil	servants	(Monjardet	et	Mouhanna,	2005).	This	strategy	has	a	huge	influence	
on	the	implementation	of	the	philosophy	of	community	oriented	policing	in	France	&	Paris.	
It	means	 that	 for	example	 the	police	officers	working	 for	 the	French	National	Police	Force	
are	focussed	on	law	and	order	or	zero	tolerance	strategies	and	are	not	at	all	involved	in	any	
kind	 of	 prevention.	 They	 abandon	 what	 they	 call	 “inconvenient”	 missions	 such	 as	 being	
present	at	schools’	doors	or	participating	in	sports	meetings	with	teenagers.	As	a	result,	the	
local	authorities	in	Paris	(and	other	French	cities),	experiment	with	‘new’	forms	of	policing.	It	
stimulates	 the	 idea	 of	 Municipal	 police	 forces	 and	 all	 kinds	 of	 new	 services	 in	 charge	 of	
prevention.	A	process	that	leads	to	a	pluralisation	in	security	provision	in	Paris,	called	plural	
policing.		
	
	
The	emergence	or	development	of	municipal	 police	 forces	 and	other	public	
uniformed	surveillance	agencies	in	Paris	
	
While	 today’s	 budget	 cuts	 lead	 to	 downsizing	 national	 police	 forces;	 the	 question	 of	 the	
emergence	or	development	of	municipal	police	forces,	whose	staff	would	report	to	and	be	
paid	by	mayors,	is	being	raised	throughout	the	country	(Malochet,	2007).	As	far	as	the	Paris	
metropolitan	area	is	concerned,	the	incredibly	diverse	and	dispersed	municipal	strategies	do	
converge	on	this	particular	topic.	Rich	towns	such	as	Levallois-Perret,	where	insecurity	is	not	
a	 pressing	 issue	 but	 feelings	 of	 insecurity	 are	 very	 high,	 have	 long	 since	 opted	 for	 strong	
police	 staffing.	New	recruits	 came	as	an	addition	 to	existing	national	police	 forces.	Hence,	
377	 municipal	 police	 forces,	 with	 huge	 discrepancies	 in	 size,	 cover	 407	 out	 of	 1,280	
communes	 in	 the	 Ile-de-France	 region,	 and	 75%	 of	 the	 population	 (Le	 Goff,	 2009).	
Nevertheless,	200	of	them	comprise	less	than	5	police	officers.	Weaponry	and	assignments	
vary	from	one	place	to	another.	Other	city	councils,	however,	some	of	them	among	the	most	
impacted	 by	 insecurity	 or	 affected	 by	 the	 riots	 of	 2005,	 refuse	 such	 policies,	 arguing	 that	
they	cannot	afford	them21	or	 that	 they	will	not	 take	responsibility	 for	what	 is	essentially	a	
                                                
20 Source: Prefecture of Police-2010. Today, the number of police officers depending from the PP is 30 000.  
21 The average estimated cost of a municipal police force is € 25 per capita (Source: Le GOFF-IAU) 
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mission	 of	 the	 State,	 on	 grounds	 of	 republican	 fairness.	 Some	 mayors	 don’t	 want	 to	 be	
accountable	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 safety,	 even	 if	 this	 position	 gets	 less	 support	 today.	 In	 other	
words,	they	will	not	act	as	a	substitute	for	the	State.	Indeed,	the	build-up	of	municipal	police	
often	entails	a	withdrawal	of	State	forces	in	the	medium	term.		
	
Partisanship	seems	to	have	little	influence	these	days	on	whether	a	given	town	will	opt	in	or	
out	of	municipal	police.	While	radical	left-wing	city	councils,	especially	those	still	held	by	the	
Communist	 party,	 tend	 to	 be	 less	 committed	 in	 this	 trend,	 in	 the	 greater	 Paris	 area	 as	 in	
many	others,	the	right-left	chasm	does	not	mean	much	when	it	comes	to	security	(Ferret	&	
Mouhanna,	 2005).	 Thus,	 the	 decision	 of	 opting	 for	 municipal	 police	 is	 based	 on	 several	
factors,	 ranging	 from	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 commune	 has	 a	 national	 police	 station	
(commissariat)	to	financial	considerations,	through	political	opportunism	or	insecurity	–	real	
or	perceived	by	residents.	 If	some	cities	 like	Levallois	Perret	have	developed	a	consequent	
police	force,	with	a	clear	involvement	of	the	mayor	in	security	issues,	many	others	limit	their	
investment	in	this	field.		
	
Up	till	now,	the	Socialist	mayors22	of	Paris	rejected	the	idea	of	a	municipal	police	force.	They	
do	not	challenge	the	authority	of	the	Prefect	of	Police,	except	marginally	(street	planning).	
This	 topic,	however,	 failed	 to	draw	consensus	 for	quite	a	while,	as	evidenced	by	 the	2001	
city	 council	 election	 campaign	 debates.	 The	 then	 mayor,	 fearing	 defeat	 (indeed	 he	 lost	
against	 the	 left),	 was	 actively	 promoting	 the	 idea	 of	 such	 a	 force.	 This	 strategy	 was	
consistent	with	 the	 security	 themes	 that	were	 being	 pushed	 to	 the	 fore	 at	 national	 level	
during	this	campaign.	Although	this	campaign	for	a	municipal	police	force	ultimately	failed,	
the	 city	 council	developed	 its	own	operation,	which	 supplemented	 the	Prefecture’s	 rather	
than	competing	with	 them.	The	city	 council	 campaign	of	2014	 showed	no	 real	differences	
between	left	and	right	parties	as	far	as	a	local	police	force	is	concerned.	
	
Little	 by	 little,	 the	Direction	 de	 la	 Prévention	 et	 de	 la	 Protection	 [DPP],	 depending	 on	 the	
mayor,	 increasingly	 appeared	 as	 an	 entity	 which,	 however	 embryonic,	 might	 eventually	
replace	the	Prefecture,	should	the	mayor	change	track.	For	now,	in	addition	to	headquarters	
exploiting	 growing	 numbers	 of	 CCTV	 cameras,	 the	 DPP	 employs	 1,313	 surveillance	 and	
protection	 agents,23	 mainly	 entrusted	 with	 the	 protection	 of	 municipal	 facilities	 and	
patrolling	 capacities.	 These	 are	 low	 figures	 indeed	 if	 compared	 to	 the	 staffing	 of	 national	
police,	 however	 other	 city	 staff	 do	 perform	 security-related	 assignments.	 Some	 of	 these	
officers	 are	 to	be	 found	outside	 schools,	 acting	 as	 crossing-guards,	 a	 task	 that	 used	 to	be	
carried	out	by	national	police.	Another	573	agents	are	involved	in	surveillance	in	City	parks	
and	gardens.		
	
Furthermore,	while	the	city	council	of	Paris	substantially	foots	the	bill	for	the	Prefecture	de	
Police,	 it	 also	 directly	 pays	 the	 salaries	 of	 the	 2,000	 Paris	Agents	 de	 Surveillance	 [ASP],	 a	
unique	body	 in	France,	which	 is	 in	charge	of	 traffic	and	parking	policing	 in	 the	capital	city.	
These	 officers	 are	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 national	 police	 stations	 (police	
commissariats).	 However,	 it	 is	 entirely	 conceivable	 that	 they	 will	 be	 transferred	 to	 a	
municipal	force,	even	though	the	limitations	of	training	do	not	enable	them	to	substitute	for	
                                                
22 It is expected that the new Socialist Mayor Anne Hildago, who took over from Bertrand Delanoë in April 
2014, will build on his main ideas in relation to security policy.  
23 Source: Paris city council-2012 
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national	police.	Up	till	April	2014,	the	socialist	mayor	Delanoë	has	always	refused	to	build	a	
Parisian	police	force.	He	defends	a	“national	republican	vision	of	policing”	which	implies	that	
the	State	has	to	run	the	police	forces	and	that	there	should	be	equal	forces	all	around	the	
territory.	An	aspiration	that	does	not	totally	reflect	reality.		
	
It	 is	 clear	 that	 within	 the	 city	 of	 Paris	 security	 matters	 are	 driven	 by	 politics	 and	 not	 by	
economic	considerations.	There	are	three	important	players.	The	State,	which	remains	eager	
to	keep	 the	upper	hand	on	 security	and	public	order	 in	 the	 capital.	 Secondly,	 the	prefect,	
who	 remains	 extremely	 autonomous,	 even	 towards	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Interior.	 Thirdly	 the	
mayor	who	prefers	 to	sidestep	direct	management	of	security	 issues	 for	 the	time	being.	A	
balance	that	brings	Paris	into	a	status	quo.		
	
Up	till	now	(2014),	the	local	police	forces	have	limited	judicial	power.	They	can	arrest	people	
committing	crime	but	they	are	not	allowed	to	do	investigations,	to	execute	a	‘stop	&	search’	
operation	or	to	put	somebody	into	custody.	In	Paris,	this	is	not	perceived	to	be	a	problem	by	
the	Mayor	as	he	wants	the	municipal	police	force	to	be	oriented	towards	prevention.	In	fact,	
more	and	more	new	units	are	created	to	do	mediation	and	prevention.	For	example,	in	some	
very	 sensitive	 areas	 in	 Paris,	 the	 so	 called	 “correspondants	 de	 nuit”	 are	working	 between	
four	p.m.	and	midnight	(de	Maillard,	2013).	These	units	were	created	in	2002	and	120	agents	
are	 now	 deployed	 in	 11	 areas.	 They	 are	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 homeless,	 control	 of	 public	
equipment	 (lights,	 road,	 etc…),	 prevention	 of	 damages	 and	mediation	 between	 people	 in	
conflict.	They	insist	on	their	status	of	not	belonging	to	the	police	corps	as	the	National	Police	
Officers	have	a	bad	image	amongst	youngsters	from	ethnic	minorities.	As	they	are	not	using	
force,	these	units	tends	to	lack	authority	in	the	field	however.		
	
	
Private	commercial	security	agencies	:	supplements	or	substitutes?	
	
All	 over	 the	 world,	 a	 wave	 of	 privatisations	 has	 swept	 the	 field	 of	 security	 (Shearing	 &	
Stenning,	1987).	Paris	is	no	exception	to	this	rule.	Big	retailers	and	department	stores,	banks,	
and	even	ministries	resort	to	private	security	companies	to	regulate	access	to	their	premises	
and	protect	their	property.	The	respective	share	of	the	public	and	private	sectors	are	difficult	
to	assess	in	matters	of	security.	There	is	no	doubt	the	state	is	largely	withdrawing	from	the	
field,	especially	from	such	functions	as	people	and	property	protection.	This	trend,	initiated	
long	ago,	is	currently	intensified	(Ocqueteau,	1997).		
The	 specificity	 of	 Paris	 makes	 it	 harder	 to	 determine	 whether	 private	 providers	 tend	 to	
substitute	for	public	forces	or	the	development	of	private	security	is	merely	supplementing	
the	current	police	forces.	Indeed,	the	presence	of	the	national	police	force	remains	massive	
and	quite	visible.	Still	its	main	focus	is	on	public	order.	Hence,	any	withdrawal	–	from	school	
crossing	 supervision,	 mall	 patrols,	 etc.	 –	 will	 be	 offset	 by	 an	 increasing	 demand	 on	 the	
private	sector,	while	the	national	police	force	will	tend	to	focus	on	its	core	mission	while	still	
maintaining	a	high	level	of	staffing	in	Paris.		
	
One	 of	 the	 major	 emerging	 players	 in	 terms	 of	 volume	 these	 last	 few	 years	 is	 the	
‘Groupement	parisien	inter-bailleurs	de	surveillance’24	(GPIS).	This	45	patrol,	115	man	force,	
                                                
24 Paris inter-lessors surveillance group 
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created	in	2004	upon	the	initiative	of	9	social	housing	lessors,	carries	out	night	patrols	in	the	
rough	 areas	 of	 northern	 Paris,	 an	 allegedly	 risky	 task.25	 As	 far	 as	 GPIS	 is	 concerned,	 it	 is	
legitimate	to	call	upon	security	privatisation	since	these	patrols	substitute	for	police	patrols.	
They	make	arrests	and	 intervene	when	groups	of	young	people	 threaten	peace	and	quiet.	
National	police	unions	complain	about	the	competition	introduced	by	this	situation.	At	the	
same	 time,	 they	 are	 quite	 happy	 to	 take	 delivery	 of	 GPIS’	 arrestees,	which	 improve	 their	
success	 statistics	 without	 exposing	 them	 to	 street	 hazards.	 However,	 the	 public	 versus	
private	 sector	 clash	 remains	quite	 limited	 in	 this	 instance,	 since	half	 the	budget	of	GPIS	 is	
funded	by	 the	Paris	city	council,	while	 the	other	half	 is	provided	by	social	housing	 lessors,	
many	of	which	belong	 to	 the	public	 sector.	Hence,	 it	 is	 less	a	matter	of	privatisation	 than	
creeping	municipalisation	of	public	security.	
Other	organisations	too	have	decided	to	create	their	own	security	forces,	which	exist	next	to	
the	 units	 of	 the	National	 police	 doing	 the	 same	 job.	 For	 example,	 the	 two	 transportation	
services,	the	Regie	Autonome	des	Transports	Parisiens	(RATP)	for	the	metro	and	busses	and	
the	 Société	 Nationale	 des	 Chemins	 de	 fer	 Français	 (SNCF)	 for	 the	 trains,	 have	 developed	
units	 in	 order	 to	 fight	 against	 crime	 and	 fear	 of	 crime	 inside	 their	 buildings	 and	 vehicles.	
Although	a	special	branch	of	the	Police	Nationale-préfecture	de	police	de	Paris	is	dedicated	
to	 this	mission,	with	more	 or	 less	 1600	 officers,	 transportation	 authorities	 are	 persuaded	
that	it	is	not	enough	as	many	Parisians,	whether	they	use	the	metro	or	not,	find	it	the	most	
dangerous	place	in	the	city.	That	explains	why	the	RATP	has	created	its	own	police	force	in	
1994	called	‘Groupe	de	protection	et	de	sécurisation	des	réseaux’	(GPSR).	GPSR	consists	of	
1000	agents	who	are	carrying	non-lethal	weapons	(including	gaz	and	Taser)	although	some	
are	wearing	lethal	arms.	Since	the	nineties	the	National	Rail	company,	la	SNCF	has	decided	
to	 transform	 its	 guards,	 who	 were	 plain	 clothes	 agents,	 in	 an	 uniformed	 force	 called	
Surveillance	générale	 (Suge).	 Suge	 consists	of	 2800	agents,	 among	 them	1400	 in	 the	Paris	
metropolitan	 area.	 Like	 the	municipal	 police	 forces,	 the	members	 of	GPSR	 and	 Suge	have	
limited	 powers.	 They	 can	 arrest	 people	 doing	 a	 crime	 or	 refusing	 to	 pay	 their	 travelling	
ticket,	but	they	have	to	refer	as	soon	as	possible	to	a	National	Police	officer,	who	is	the	only	
one	who	has	the	right	to	build	a	criminal	case	and	to	send	it	to	the	prosecutor’s	office.		
In	 Paris	 (and	 France)	 the	 privatisation	 of	 security	 appears	 to	 be	 mainstream.	 Almost	 all	
commercial	centres	have	their	security	service.	Their	agents	are	mostly	oriented	towards	the	
prevention	of	shoplifting.	When	they	arrest	a	thief,	they	are	authorized	by	the	prosecutor	to	
impose	 a	 fine.	 In	 the	 biggest	 commercial	 centres,	 the	 private	 companies	 agents	 are	
patrolling	 in	 the	 alleys,	 looking	 for	 pickpockets	 but	 also	 paying	 attention	 to	 every	 kind	 of	
“trouble”.	 They	 focus	 especially	 on	 group	 of	 youngsters,	 who	 are	 perceived	 to	 frighten	
“honest	 citizens”.	Many	 of	 these	 private	 agents	 belong	 to	 ethnic	minorities	 and/or	 live	 in	
poor	areas	but	they	contribute	to	the	protection	of	“the	temple	of	consumption”.	Not	very	
well	 paid,	 these	agents	 tend	 to	 replace	 the	police	officers	 in	many	places.	At	 the	national	
level,	 it	 is	 said	 that	 the	number	of	private	agents	 is	 around	200	000,	an	equivalent	 to	 the	
number	of	public	officers	in	the	field	of	security.	
This	 in	 no	 way	 rules	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 seeing	 other	 forms	 of	 private	 security	 gather	
momentum.	 However,	 this	 would	 have	 more	 to	 do	 with	 hybridisation	 than	 competition,	
given	the	numerous	links	between	the	public	and	the	private	sector.	For	example,	at	night,	
                                                
25 Source: Paris city council-2012 
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more	and	more	bars	prefer	self-regulation	and	provide	their	own	guards	in	order	to	prevent	
drunk	or	“bad”	people	to	come	 in.	They	are	aware	of	 the	fact	 that	the	 intervention	of	 the	
national	police	force	in	case	of	problems	increases	the	chance	of	a	profound	control	in	their	
bar	on	criteria	related	to	noise,	maximum	numbers	allowed	in	the	bar	and	the	age	of	their	
customers.	Providing	their	own	guards	prevents	the	chance	of	police	forces	being	around	or	
in	their	bars,	which	generates	a	negative	image.	
	
	
Conclusion	and	reflections	
	
As	 the	 capital	 city	of	 a	 state	 that	 remains	extremely	 centralised	–	especially	 in	 its	policing	
and	security	policies	–	and	given	 its	political,	economic,	and	demographic	prominence,	the	
Paris	metropolitan	area	stands	out	as	the	most	developed	example	of	centralisation	and	the	
State’s	 wish	 to	 control	 its	 citizens.	 The	 political-administrative	 context	 of	 policing	 Paris	
generated	a	Police	Prefect	that	can	be	considered	as	the	almighty	in	the	field	of	security.	A	
strong	 National	 Police	 Force	 suppresses	 the	 development	 of	 municipal	 police	 forces.	
Nevertheless,	 other	 public	 uniformed	 surveillance	 agencies	 are	 present	 in	 this	metropolis.	
Together	 with	 the	 private	 commercial	 security	 agents	 they	 are	 contributing	 to	 the	
pluralisation	of	security	provision	in	Paris.		
	
Despite	the	observed	pluralisation	described	above,	Paris	is	still	a	‘state’	in	the	state.	It	is	a	
city	in	which	police	forces	are	mainly	built	to	protect	the	state.	It	creates	a	context	in	which	
less	space	is	open	for	other	initiatives.	It	rather	confirms	the	Napoleonic	nature	of	the	police	
system	in	which	civil	non-commercial	initiatives	are	‘suppressed’	or	do	simply	not	‘survive’.	
In	 Paris,	 organized	 neighbourhood	 watch	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 welcomed.	 The	 self-organized	
Neighbourhood	watch	operations	 that	were	built	 in	 some	area	–for	 example	 in	 Stalingrad	
place	at	the	beginning	of	2000-	were	not	sustained	neither	by	the	Prefecture	nor	by	the	city	
council.	 All	 this	 kind	 of	 initiatives	 in	 France	 have	 to	 be	 built	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	
Police	Nationale	and	the	‘watchers’	have	to	be	informants	for	the	police	forces.	Otherwise,	
these	groups	are	compromised.	They	are	 told	 to	be	the	defender	of	selfish	 interests	while	
the	National	Police	forces	represent	the	public	 interest.	As	a	consequence,	vigilante	or	self	
defense	initiatives	are	rare	in	France,	and	especially	in	Paris,	where	citizens	often	associate	
this	kind	of	initiatives	with	“fascism”.	
	
From	this	Napoleonic	non-democratic	 tradition,	citizen	participation	can	only	be	perceived	
from	an	instrumental	point	of	view	(Easton	&	Van	Ryckeghem,	2012).	It	means	that	citizens	
can	be	no	more	 than	 ‘informants’	 for	 the	police	or	 victims	 that	must	 be	protected.	 Some	
police	 officers	 call	 the	 Parisians	 “welfare	 recipients”	 or	 potentially	 dangerous	 people	who	
have	 to	 be	 controlled	 and	managed.	 They	 are	 never	 considered	 as	 partners	 in	 building	 a	
security	strategy	for	Paris.		
On	the	other	hand	citizens	in	Paris	tend	to	feel	very	comfortable	with	this	situation.	They	are	
not	 claiming	 any	 power	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 police	 priorities.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 citizens	
accept	 the	 heavy	 presence	 of	 public	 police	 officers	 whose	 image	 is	 the	 protection	 of	 the	
State	 and	 the	 Nation	 (Mouhanna,	 2011).	 It	 is	 an	 example	 of	 what	 has	 been	 called	 the	
professionalization	paradox.	 This	 is	 a	process	 in	which	 the	 solution	of	 societal	problems	 is	
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assigned	to	professionals	which	generates	an	inability	of	citizens	to	address	these	problems	
themselves	(Arnstein,	1969;	Vos	&	Van	Doorn,	2004).		
	
It	is	clear	that	despite	the	fact	that	Paris,	like	many	other	European	cities,	has	gone	through	
a	 process	 of	 pluralisation;	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 outcome	 is	 still	 influenced	 by	 its	 Napoleonic	
tradition.	
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